The Arctic Expedition which returned to our shores in the autumn of 1876 may be regarded as having finally decided the question whether the North Pole of the earth is accessible by the route through Smith’s Sound—a route which may conveniently and properly be called the American route. Attacks may hereafter be made on the Polar fastness from other directions; but it is exceedingly unlikely that this country, at any rate, will again attempt to reach the Pole along the line of attack followed by Captain Nares’s expedition. I may be forgiven, perhaps, for regarding Arctic voyages made by the seamen of other nations as less likely to be successful than those made by my own countrymen. It is not mere national prejudice which suggests this opinion. It is the simple fact that hitherto the most successful approaches towards both the Northern and the Southern Poles have been made by British sailors. Nearly a quarter of a century has passed since Sir E. Parry made the nearest approach to the North Pole recorded up to that time; and although, in the interval between Parry’s expedition and Nares’s, no expedition had been sent out from our shores with the object of advancing towards the Pole, while America, Sweden, Russia, and Germany sent out several, Parry’s attempt still remained unsurpassed and unequalled. At length it has been surpassed, but it has been by his own countrymen. In like manner, no nation has yet succeeded in approaching the Antarctic Pole so nearly, within many miles, as did Captain Sir J. C. Ross in 1844. Considering157 these circumstances, and remembering the success which rewarded the efforts of Great Britain in the search for the North-West Passage, it cannot be regarded as national prejudice to assert that events indicate the seamen of this country as exceptionally fitted to contend successfully against the difficulties and the dangers of Arctic exploration. Should England, then, give up the attempt to reach the North Pole by way of Smith’s Sound and its northerly prolongation, it may fairly be considered unlikely that the Pole will ever be reached in that direction.

It may be well to examine the relative probable chances of success along other routes which have either not been so thoroughly tried, or have been tried under less favourable conditions.

Passing over the unfortunate expedition under Hugh Willoughby in 1553, the first attempt to penetrate within the Polar domain was made by Henry Hudson in 1607. The route selected was one which many regard (and I believe correctly) as the one on which there is the best chance of success; namely, the route across the sea lying to the west of Spitzbergen. That Hudson, in the clumsy galleons of Elizabeth’s time, should have penetrated to within eight degrees and a half of the Pole, or to a distance only exceeding Nares’s nearest approach by about 130 miles, proves conclusively, we think, that with modern ships, and especially with the aid of steam, this route might be followed with much better prospect of success than that which was adopted for Nares’s expedition. If the reader will examine a map of the Arctic regions he will find that the western shores of Spitzbergen and the north-eastern shores of Greenland, as far as they have been yet explored, are separated by about 33 degrees of longitude, equivalent on the 80th parallel of latitude to about 335 miles. Across the whole breadth of this sea Arctic voyagers have attempted to sail northwards beyond the 80th parallel, but no one has yet succeeded in the attempt except on the eastern side of that sea. It was here that Hudson—fortunately for him—directed his attack;158 and he passed a hundred miles to the north of the 80th parallel, being impeded and finally stopped by the packed ice around the north-western shores of Spitzbergen.

Let us consider the fortunes of other attempts which have been made to approach the Pole in this direction.

In 1827 Captain (afterwards Sir Edward) Parry, who had already four times passed beyond the Arctic Circle—viz., in 1818, 1819, 1821–23, and 1824–25—made an attempt to reach the North Pole by way of Spitzbergen. His plan was to follow Hudson’s route until stopped by ice; then to leave his ship, and cross the ice-field with sledges drawn by Esquimaux dogs, and, taking boats along with the party, to cross whatever open water they might find. In this way he succeeded in reaching latitude 82° 45′ north, the highest ever attained until Nares’s expedition succeeded in crossing the 83rd parallel. Parry found that the whole of the ice-field over which his party were laboriously travelling northwards was being carried bodily southwards, and that at length the distance they were able to travel in a day was equalled by the southerly daily drift of the ice-field, so that they made no real progress. He gave up further contest, and returned to his ship the Hecla.

It is important to inquire whether the southerly drift which stopped Parry was due to northerly winds or to a southerly current; and if to the latter cause, whether this current probably affects the whole extent of the sea in which Parry’s ice-field was drifting. We know that his party were exposed, during the greater part of their advance from Spitzbergen, to northerly winds. Now the real velocity of these winds must have been greater than their apparent velocity, because the ice-field was moving southwards. Had this not been the case, or had the ice-field been suddenly stopped, the wind would have seemed stronger; precisely as it seems stronger to passengers on board a sailing vessel when, after being before the wind for a time, she is brought across the wind. The ice-field was clearly travelling before the wind, but not nearly so fast as the wind; and therefore there is159 good reason for believing that the motion of the ice-field was due to the wind alone. If we suppose this to have been really the case, then, as there is no reason for believing that northerly winds prevail uniformly in the Arctic regions, we must regard Parry’s defeat as due to mischance. Another explorer might have southerly instead of northerly winds, and so might be assisted instead of impeded in his advance towards the Pole. Had this been Parry’s fortune, or even if the winds had proved neutral, he would have approached nearer to the Pole than Nares. For Parry reckoned that he had lost more than a hundred miles by the southerly drift of the ice-field, by which amount at least he would have advanced further north. But that was not all; for there can be little doubt that he would have continued his efforts longer but for the Sisyph?an nature of the struggle. It is true he was nearer home when he turned back than he would have been but for the drift, and one of his reasons for turning back was the consideration of the distance which his men had to travel in returning. But he was chiefly influenced (so far as the return journey was concerned) by the danger caused by the movable nature of the ice-field, which might at any time begin to travel northwards, or eastwards, or westwards.

If we suppose that not the wind but Arctic currents carried the ice-field southwards, we must yet admit the probability—nay, almost the certainty—that such currents are only local, and occupy but a part of the breadth of the North Atlantic seas in those high latitudes. The general drift of the North Atlantic surface-water is unquestionably not towards the south but towards the north; and whatever part we suppose the Arctic ice to perform in regulating the system of oceanic circulation—whether, with Carpenter, we consider the descent of the cooled water as the great moving cause of the entire system of circulation, or assign to that motion a less important office (which seems to me the juster opinion)—we must in any case regard the Arctic seas as a region of surface indraught. The current flowing from those seas, which caused (on the hypothesis we are for the moment160 adopting) the southwardly motion of Parry’s ice-field, must therefore be regarded as in all probability an exceptional phenomenon of those seas. By making the advance from a more eastwardly or more westwardly part of Spitzbergen, a northerly current would probably be met with; or rather, the motion of the ice-field would indicate the presence of such a current, for I question very much whether open water would anywhere be found north of the 83rd parallel. In that case, a party might advance in one longitude and return in another, selecting for their return the longitude in which (always according to our present hypothesis that currents caused the drift) Parry found that a southerly current underlay his route across the ice. On the whole, however, it appears to me more probable that winds, not currents, caused the southerly drift of Parry’s ice-field.

In 1868, a German expedition, under Captain Koldewey, made the first visit to the seas west of Spitzbergen in a steamship, the small but powerful screw steamer Germania (126 tons), advancing northwards a little beyond the 81st parallel. But this voyage can scarcely be regarded as an attempt to approach the Pole on that course; for Koldewey’s instructions were, “to explore the eastern coast of Greenland northwards; and, if he found success in that direction impossible, to make for the mysterious Island of Gilles on the east of Spitzbergen.”

Scoresby in 1806 had made thus far the most northerly voyage in a ship on Hudson’s route, but in 1868 a Swedish expedition attained higher latitudes than had ever or have ever been reached by a ship in that direction. The steamship Sofia, strongly built of Swedish iron, and originally intended for winter voyages in the Baltic, was selected for the voyage. Owing to a number of unfortunate delays, it was not until September, 1868, that the Sofia reached the most northerly part of her journey, attaining a point nearly fifteen miles further north than Hudson had reached. To the north broken ice was still found, but it was so closely packed that not even a boat could pass through. Two161 months earlier in the season the voyagers might have waited for a change of wind and the breaking up of the ice; but in the middle of September this would have been very dangerous. The temperature was already sixteen degrees below the freezing-point, and there was every prospect that in a few weeks, or even days, the seas over which they had reached their present position would be icebound. They turned back from that advanced position; but, with courage worthy of the old Vikings, they made another attack a fortnight later. They were foiled again, as was to be expected, for by this time the sun was already on the wintry side of the equator. They had, indeed, a narrow escape from destruction. “An ice-block with which they came into collision opened a large leak in the ship’s side, and when, after great exertions, they reached the land, the water already stood two feet over the cabin floor.”21

On the western side of the North Atlantic Channel—so to term the part lying between Greenland and Spitzbergen—the nearest approach towards the Pole was made by the Dutch in 1670, nearly all the more recent attempts to reach high northern latitudes in this direction having hitherto ended in failure more or less complete.

We have already seen that Captain Koldewey was charged to explore the eastern coast of Greenland in the Germania in 1868. In 1869 the Germania was again despatched under his command from Bremerhaven, in company with the Hansa, a sailing vessel. Lieutenant Payer and other Austrian savants accompanied Captain Koldewey. The attack was again made along the eastern shores of Greenland. As far as the 74th degree the two vessels kept company; but at this stage it happened unfortunately that a signal from the Germania was misinterpreted,162 and the Hansa left her. Soon after, the Hansa was crushed by masses of drifting ice, and her crew and passengers took refuge on an immense ice-floe seven miles in circumference. Here they built a hut, which was in its turn crushed. Winds and currents carried their icy home about, and at length broke it up. Fortunately they had saved their boats, and were able to reach Friedrichsthal, a missionary station in the south of Greenland, whence they were conveyed to Copenhagen in September, 1870. Returning to the Germania, we find that she had a less unfortunate experience. She entered the labyrinth of sinuous fjords, separated by lofty promontories, and girt round by gigantic glaciers, which characterize the eastern coast of Greenland to the north of Scoresby Sound. In August the channels by which she had entered were closed, and the Germania was imprisoned. So soon as the ice would bear them, Koldewey and his companions made sledging excursions to various points around their ship. But in November the darkness of the polar winter settled down upon them, and these excursions ceased. The polar winter of 1869–70 was “characterized by a series of violent northerly tempests, one of which continued more than 100 hours, with a velocity (measured by the anemometer) of no less than sixty miles an hour”—a velocity often surpassed, indeed, but which must have caused intense suffering to all who left the shelter of the ship; for it is to be remembered that the air which thus swept along at the rate of a mile a minute was the bitter air of the Arctic regions. The thermometer did not, however, descend lower than 26° below zero, or 58° below the freezing-point—a cold often surpassed in parts of the United States. I have myself experienced a cold of more than 30° below zero, at Niagara. “With proper precautions as regards shelter and clothing,” proceeds the narrative, “even extreme cold need not cause great suffering to those who winter in such regions. One of the worst things to be endured is the physical and moral weariness of being cut off from external163 observations during the long night of some ninety days, relieved only by the strange Northern Lights. The ice accumulates all round with pressure, and assumes peculiar and fantastic forms, emitting ever and anon ominous noises. Fortunately, the Germania lay well sheltered in a harbour opening southwards, and, being protected by a rampart of hills on the north, was able to resist the shock of the elements. The sun appearing once more about the beginning of February, the scientific work of exploration began.... The pioneers of the Germania advanced as far as the 77th degree of latitude, in longitude 18° 50′ west from Greenwich. There was no sign of an open sea towards the Pole. Had it not been for want of provisions, the party could have prolonged their sledge journey indefinitely. The bank of ice, without remarkable protuberances, extends to about two leagues from the shore, which from this extreme point seems to trend towards the north-west, where the view was bounded by lofty mountains.” As the expedition was only equipped for one winter, it returned to Europe in September, 1870, without having crossed the 78th parallel of north latitude.

Captain Koldewey was convinced, by the results of his exploration, that there is no continuous channel northwards along the eastern coast of Greenland. It does not seem to me that his expedition proved this beyond all possibility of question. Still, it seems clear that the eastern side of the North Atlantic is less suited than the western for the attempt to reach the North Pole. The prevailing ocean-currents are southerly on that side, just as they are northerly on the western side. The cold also is greater, the lines of equal temperature lying almost exactly in the direction of the channel itself—that is, nearly north and south—and the cold increasing athwart that direction, towards the west. The nearer to Greenland the greater is the cold.22

164 The next route to be considered in order of time would be the American route; but I prefer to leave this to the last, as the latest results relate to that route. I take next, therefore, a route which some regard as the most promising of all—that, namely, which passes between Spitzbergen and the Scandinavian peninsula.

It will be remembered that Lieutenant Payer, of the Austrian navy, had accompanied Captain Koldewey’s first expedition. When driven back from the attempt to advance along the eastern shores of Greenland, that commander crossed over to Spitzbergen, and tried to find the Land of Gilles. He also accompanied Koldewey’s later expedition, and shared his belief that there is no continuous channel northwards on the western side of the North Atlantic channel. Believing still, however, with Dr. Petermann, the geographer, that there is an open Polar sea beyond the ice-barrier, Payer set out in 1871, in company with Weyprecht, towards the Land of Gilles. They did not find this mysterious land, but succeeded in passing 150 miles further north, after rounding the south-eastern shores of Spitzbergen, than any Arctic voyagers who had before penetrated into the region lying between Spitzbergen and Novaia Zemlia. Here they found, beyond the 76th parallel, and between 42° and 60° east longitude, an open sea, and a temperature of between 5° and 7° above the freezing-point. Unfortunately, they had not enough provisions with them to be able safely to travel further north, and were thus compelled to return. The season seems to have been an unusually open one; and it is much to be regretted that the expedition was not better165 supplied with provisions—a defect which appears to be not uncommon with German expeditions.

Soon after their return, Payer and Weyprecht began to prepare for a new expedition; and this time their preparations were thorough, and adapted for a long stay in Arctic regions. “The chief aim of this expedition,” says the Revue des Deux Mondes, in an interesting account of recent Polar researches, “was to investigate the unknown regions of the Polar seas to the north of Siberia, and to try to reach Behring’s Straits by this route.” It was only if after two winters and three summers they failed to double the extreme promontory of Asia, that they were to direct their course towards the Pole. The voyagers, numbering twenty-four persons, left the Norwegian port of Tromso?, in the steamer Tegethoff, on July 14, 1872. Count Wilczek followed shortly after in a yacht, which was to convey coals and provisions to an eastern point of the Arctic Ocean, for the benefit of the Tegethoff. At a point between Novaia Zemlia and the mouth of the Petschora, the yacht lost sight of the steamer, and nothing was heard of the latter for twenty-five months. General anxiety was felt for the fate of the expedition, and various efforts were made by Austria, England, and Russia to obtain news of it. In September, 1874, the voyagers suddenly turned up at another port, and soon after entered Vienna amid great enthusiasm. Their story was a strange one.

It appears that when the Tegethoff was lost sight of (August 21, 1872), she had been surrounded by vast masses of ice, which crushed her hull. For nearly half a year the deadly embrace of the ice continued; and when at length pressure ceased, the ship remained fixed in the ice, several miles from open water. During the whole summer the voyagers tried to release their ship, but in vain. They had not, however, remained motionless all this time. The yacht had lost sight of them at a spot between Novaia Zemlia and Malaia Zemlia (in North Russia) in about 71° north latitude, and they were imprisoned not far north of this spot. But166 the ice-field was driven hither and thither by the winds, until they found themselves, on the last day of August, 1873, only 6′ or about seven miles south of the 80th parallel of latitude. Only fourteen miles from them, on the north, they saw “a mass of mountainous land, with numerous glaciers.” They could not reach it until the end of October, however, and then they had to house themselves in preparation for the long winter night. This land they called Francis Joseph Land. It lies north of Novaia Zemlia, and on the Polar side of the 80th parallel of latitude. The winter was stormy and bitterly cold, the thermometer descending on one occasion to 72° below zero—very nearly as low as during the greatest cold experienced by Nares’s party. In February, 1874, “the sun having reappeared, Lieutenant Payer began to prepare sledge excursions to ascertain the configuration of the land.... In the second excursion the voyagers entered Austria Sound, which bounds Francis Joseph Island on the east and north, and found themselves, after emerging from it, in the midst of a large basin, surrounded by several large islands. The extreme northern point reached by the expedition was a cape on one of these islands, which they named Prince Rodolph’s Land, calling the point Cape Fligely. It lies a little beyond the 81st parallel. They saw land further north beyond the 83rd degree of latitude, and named it Petermann’s Land. The archipelago thus discovered is comparable in extent to that of which Spitzbergen is the chief island.” The voyagers were compelled now to return, as the firm ice did not extend further north. They had a long, difficult, and dangerous journey southwards—sometimes on open water, in small boats, sometimes on ice, with sledges—impeded part of the time by contrary winds, and with starvation staring them in the face during the last fortnight of their journey. Fortunately, they reached Novaia Zemlia before their provisions quite failed them, and were thence conveyed to Wardho? by a Russian trading ship.

We have now only to consider the attempts which have been made to approach the North Pole by the American167 route. For, though Collinson in 1850 reached high latitudes to the north of Behring’s Straits, while Wrangel and other Russian voyagers have attempted to travel northwards across the ice which bounds the northern shores of Siberia, it can hardly be said that either route has been followed with the definite purpose of reaching the North Pole. I shall presently, however, have occasion to consider the probable value of the Behring’s Straits route, which about twelve years ago was advocated by the Frenchman Lambert.

Dr. Kane’s expedition in 1853–55 was one of those sent out in search of Sir John ............