The preceding chapter was written at Algeciras on January 2nd, 1923. On January 3rd there appeared in the Spanish papers a compressed report of the speech delivered by the American Secretary of State, Mr. Hughes, at New Haven. It made suggestions on the subject of reparations which were obviously intended for consideration at the forthcoming Paris conference. I knew the chairman of that conference, M. Poincaré, would not be too anxious to bring these proposals to the notice of his colleagues, but I had some hope that the British, Italian, and Belgian premiers might do so. I therefore cabled the following message to the British and American press:—  
"I have read with gladness Secretary Hughes's important speech. As far as I can judge from compressed report appearing in the local paper of this remote corner of Spain his suggestions and mine travel in same direction. Earnestly hope Paris[Pg 148] conference will give American proposals priority of consideration. All other expedients will but postpone mischief which will in the end have to be redeemed with compound interest at usurious rates by an embarrassed Europe."
 
I constantly refer to this speech in subsequent articles, and as it has been suggested that the interpretation I placed on it is not borne out by the text, I append the full report which appeared in The Times of December 30th, 1922:—
 
"Mr. Hughes, the Secretary of State, in a speech which he delivered before the American Historical Association at New Haven, Connecticut, to-night lifted yet another corner of the veil which has shrouded the immediate plans of the United States government. Much of his address concerned the Washington conference of 1921, but it ended with a discussion of economic conditions in Europe which are of prime importance.
 
"Mr. Hughes began with the admission that 'we cannot dispose of these problems by calling them European, for they are world problems, and we cannot escape the injurious consequences of failure[Pg 149] to settle them.' They were, however, European problems in the sense that they cannot be solved without the consent of the European governments, and the crux of the situation lay in the settlement of reparations. 'There will be no adjustment of other needs, however pressing, until a definite and accepted basis for the discharge of reparations claims has been fixed. It is futile to attempt to erect any economic structure in Europe until the foundation is laid.'
 
"Then followed a passage referring to the attempts to link up the debts owed to the United States with the question of reparations or with projects of cancellation, attempts which had been steadily resisted. It led up to a discussion of the attitude of the United States towards reparations, 'standing, as it does, a distinct question, and as one which cannot be settled unless the European governments concerned are able to agree.' First came a denial that America desired to see Germany relieved of her responsibility for the war, or of her just obligations, or that America wished that France should lose 'any part of her just claims.' On the other hand, America did not wish to see a prostrate Germany. Some Americans had [Pg 150]suggested that the United States should assume the r?le of arbitrator, but Mr. Hughes did not think 'we should assume such a burden of responsibility.'
 
"From this point the speech deserves quotation in full:
 
"'But the situation,' said Mr. Hughes, 'does call for a settlement upon its merits. The first condition of a satisfactory settlement is that the question should be taken out of politics. Statesmen, have their difficulties, their public opinion, the exigencies they must face. It is devoutly to be hoped that they will effect a settlement among themselves, and that the coming meeting in Paris will find a solution. But if it does not, what should be done?
 
"'The alternative of forcible measures to obtain reparations is not an attractive one. No one can foretell the extent of the serious consequences which might ensue from such a course. Apart from political results, I believe that the opinion of experts is that such measures will not produce reparation payments, but might tend to destroy the basis of those payments, which must be found in economic recuperation. If, however, statesmen cannot agree, and such an alternative is faced, what can be done? Is there not another way out? The fundamental [Pg 151]condition is that in this critical moment the merits of the question as an economic one must alone be regarded. Sentiment, however natural, must be disregarded; mutual recriminations are of no ............