From the outset the two chief conditions that militated against the development of Cuba and the prosperity of her people were trade restriction and the appropriation of land. In the early days of the colony large tracts of land were granted by the Crown to Castilians of noble family. These never made permanent residence on the Island, but entrusted their affairs to an agent. The wealthy land owner often had a palace on the Cerro, and occasionally paid a brief winter visit to the capital, and made a still briefer excursion to his hacienda, where his appearance in all the dignity and state of aristocratic wealth had an irritating effect upon his poor neighbors. The money produced by his sugar plantation or his cattle ranch he dissipated in the fashionable pleasures of Madrid and Paris.
This system of absentee landlordism acted like a blight upon the country until the aboli{44}tion of slavery necessitated the cutting up of large estates, or their transfer to corporations, possessed of the means of paying for the labor necessary to work them.
Not a few of the large properties were in the hands of Cubans, but in these cases the tenure was not so harmful to the country, nor as odious to the common people. The Cuban planters, most of whom were ruined during the protracted period of insurrection, invariably made their homes on the haciendas, where one generation followed another in possession. The sons usually remained with the father, each taking some particular share in the management of the estate. Thus several families were often found living under one roof and generally in perfect amity, for the Cubans are distinctly domestic people, affectionate in disposition and clannish in habit.
There were comparatively few holdings in the hands of peasant proprietors, or small farmers, and this absence of a home and land owning population was an obviously weak element in the foundation of the government.
The greater part of the productive soil was in the hands of a few grandees, and the wealth{45} extracted from it was withheld from general circulation, which had, among other harmful consequences, that of retarding the extension of agriculture and general industrial advancement.
Judged by our present conceptions of justice and policy, the commercial regulations imposed upon Cuba by Spain appear to have been extremely foolish and iniquitous, but we must bear in mind that they were quite consistent with the prevailing idea at that time that the interests of colonies should be made subservient to those of the parent country. In other words, the commercial and industrial restrictions which were imposed on Cuba, while they had the effect of exploiting the Island for the benefit of Spain, originated not so much from disregard of the colony’s welfare as from the peculiar views of political economy generally entertained in that age. Great Britain’s American possessions were subjected to similar treatment. Spain’s fatal error lay in the tenacity with which she clung to her misguided policy. A little judicious reform at the beginning of the last century, when other powers were granting to their colonies a measurable degree of freedom in trade and self-government, would{46} probably have sufficed to keep Cuba under the flag of Spain.
The restrictions on the commerce of the Island began with the royal decree of 1497, which granted to the port of Seville the conclusive privilege of trade with the colonies, these being prohibited from any commercial intercourse with any foreign countries. In 1707 this monopoly was transferred from Seville to the port of Cadiz. While it was the capital of the Island, Santiago was the sole port of entry, and after Habana became the capital, all shipments passed through it. This restricted traffic between Spain and its insular colony was jealously guarded. Trading vessels were required to assemble in flotas, or fleets, and to make the double voyage under the escort of war-ships. This arrangement was designed hardly as much for protection as for the prevention of illicit dealings with the intermediate countries. During certain periods trade with foreigners was prohibited under the most severe penalties, and it was never permissible except by special authorization. Commercial intercourse between the colonies was even forbidden. With the exception of a brief term, during which the English occupied the Island, these hampering
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THE WATER-FRONT, HABANA.
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conditions obtained until 1778, when Habana was opened to free trade. The decree authorized traffic between several ports of Cuba. Others were included in this privilege, from time to time, until, in 1803, practically all the ports of the Island enjoyed it.
For two hundred years or more, such action upon the part of the sovereign government was looked upon by all nations as good policy. In 1714 Spain and the Dutch Confederation effected a convention by the terms of which each party was bound to refrain from every form of trade with the American possessions of the other. A similar agreement was reached between England and Spain about fifty years later. Towards the close of the eighteenth century, however, these treaties were abrogated and a royal cedula set forth that no foreign ship should be allowed to enter a Cuban port under any conditions.
The peninsular war reduced the trade of Cuba to such an extent that the Ayuntamiento and the Consulado of Habana seriously debated the expediency of throwing the port entirely open and admitting foreign goods on a parity with those of the home country. In consideration of the emergency the restraints on trade{48} were substantially released during the first decade of the nineteenth century. Shortly afterwards, the Government sought to re?stablish them, but was induced to refrain by the protestations of Captain-General Marques de Someruelos, who made a forcible representation of the economic necessities of the colony and the impossibility of their being met under the restricting policy.
The least concession was wrung from the Council of the Indies with the utmost difficulty. They remained convinced that the limitations of the commerce of the colonies to the mother country was the best course for the latter, at least, and secured a virtual resumption of the condition by indirect means. By excessive duties, discriminating tariffs, and the heavy port dues, foreign trade was placed at such a great disadvantage that the Cubans, although ostensibly free in the matter, found themselves again restricted for the most part to commerce with Spain.
The first tariff of Cuba, enforced in 1818, imposed a duty of forty-three per cent. ad valorem on all foreign merchandise, except agricultural implements and machinery, which were taxed twenty-six and one-half per cent. These{49} rates were somewhat reduced a few years later. Similar importations from Spain were granted a preferential reduction of one-third from these rates. But, as Spain produced a very small proportion of the articles that comprised Cuba’s imports, her merchants secured them from various foreign sources, and, of course, the consumers were compelled to pay higher prices than if they had been allowed to deal directly with the producers under an impartial system of duties.
In 1828 an export tariff was imposed on sugar and coffee, which, by this time, had become important products. Four-fifths of a cent per pound was levied on the former, and two-fifths on the latter. A form of shipping bounty added to the weight of these exactions. In case the exports were carried in foreign bottoms the duty on sugar was doubled and that on coffee increased to one cent a pound.
This tariff was maintained without material change until a reciprocal commercial agreement was effected by the United States and Spain in 1891. For the first time in its history, Cuba found itself in a position to trade on favorable terms with its nearest and best market. As a result the trade of the Island was soon trans{50}ferred, almost in its entirety, to the United States, and its people enjoyed a term of prosperity transcending anything in their former experience. The change was, however, short lived. In 1894 the termination of the agreement and the re?stablishment of the old regulations forced compulsory traffic with Spain upon the Cubans.
But the burdens entailed upon the people by trade restrictions were by no means all that they were called on to bear. A system of heavy and vexatious taxation prevailed during the entire period of Spain’s dominance over the Island. Taxes were levied on all kinds of property and on every form of industry. Every profession and occupation was taxed. Legal papers, petitions and business documents were required to be stamped.
There was a “consumption tax” on the killing of cattle which, of course, increased the price of meat to the consumer. There was an impost of twenty ducats, called the derecho de averia, collected upon every person who arrived on the Island. This was established in the earliest years of the colony and maintained until near the close of the eighteenth century. During the last hundred years of its enforce{51}ment, the amount was increased from sixteen dollars to twenty-two dollars. It is needless to say that this tax seriously impeded immigration of the peasant class most needed by the country.
There was a lottery tax, and a “cedula,” or head tax. The latter proved very burdensome to the poorest of the people who, when in arrears of it, were debarred from the exercise of most rights and privileges involving civil and ecclesiastical authorization. Thus, they could not make contracts, enter into marriages, or secure baptism for their children until the overdue tax had been paid.
Obviously such a system of taxation worked the utmost discouragement to the acquisition of property and the pursuit of industries. Had the design of the Peninsular Government been to ruin the Island and to suppress all development, no more effective measures for the purpose could have been devised. None but a country superlatively rich in natural resources could have carried such a burden. Like the other American colonies of Spain, Cuba received contributions, or situados, from Mexico. During the forty years following 1766, these amounted to 108,150,504 pesos fuertes. The{52} worst of it was that the large revenue derived from these heavy impositions upon the people and the trade of Cuba was either absorbed in the excessive cost of administering the Island, or diverted to the royal treasury. Comparatively little of it was spent on local public improvements, unless we should include works of a military nature. Aside from the calzada, or military highway, road-making was neglected. Harbors lacked improvements and cities were deficient in water supply, sewers and paving. In the country districts, public buildings and schoolhouses were far short of the necessities of the population. Even in late years the annual appropriation for educational purposes was no more than two hundred and fifty thousand dollars.
Aside from the riots resulting from the enforcement of the tobacco monopoly, during the term of Captain-General Roja, there was no active opposition to the Government previous to 1823. In that year an abortive insurrection followed the attempt to abrogate the liberal constitution of 1812, and re?stablish the old-time absolutism. Political agitation and revolutionary outbreaks continued from that time, stimulated by the secret societies, whose
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MOUNTAIN ROAD IN THE PROVINCE OF ORIENTE.
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branches were scattered all over the country. Under these circumstances the veiled antipathy, which had been growing between the Cubans and Spaniards, rapidly assumed the nature of a wide breach. On the one side were ranged the official class, the clerics, the beneficiaries of monopolies, and persons who derived profit in various ways from connection with the administration. On the other, were the native whites who sought independence, or at least autonomy. The latter had the sympathy and support of practically all the blacks, and of a large proportion of the colored population.
In 1836 the constitution of 1812 was re?stablished in Spain, but Cuba was deprived of the most important privileges that should have been secured to her by the change. The deputies who were sent to the constitutional convention at Madrid from Cuba were arbitrarily excluded. It was announced that the Island should be governed by special laws, but these were never published and, if definitely framed at all, must have been communicated to the officials in a semi-confidential manner.
This totally unjust and fatally unwise action on the part of the Crown stirred the existing discontent to boiling point and thereafter the{54} revolutionary movement assumed a much more menacing aspect. During the succeeding decade a number of uprisings occurred in such widely separated parts of the country as to clearly indicate that the entire Island was disaffected. The lack of connection between these outbreaks and their quick subsidence also showed an absence of organization or concerted plan. In 1847, however, a more serious revolutionary conspiracy, and one which was destined to have far-reaching effect, was set on foot by Narcisco Lopez. The movement was intelligently planned and contemplated the annexation of Cuba to the United States.
The conspiracy was betrayed to the Spanish authorities—no uncommon occurrence in the early revolutionary period—and Lopez, with the chief figures in the affair, fled to America. In 1850 Lopez with six hundred men landed at Cardenas and captured the fortress. Failing, however, to receive expected support, he immediately sailed to Key West. The following year Lopez landed another expedition in Cuba near Bahia Honda. This occasion was memorable on account of the fact that the force included one hundred and fifty men under Colonel Crittenden of Kentucky.{55} Disaster quickly overtook this attempt. The mistake was made of immediately dividing the force after landing. Lopez with one body of men advanced on Las Pozas, leaving Colonel Crittenden, with the remainder, in El Morilla. A detachment of Spanish troops overtook and defeated Lopez, after a gallant fight. The leader was captured, carried to Habana, and promptly garroted. Crittenden and his men attempted to escape by sea but were surrounded and forced to surrender. All were subsequently shot at the Castle of Atares.
This incident aroused among the people of the United States an interest in Cuban affairs, out of which there grew a sympathy for the insurgents that never abated.
Several futile efforts followed the Lopez affair, and then came the revolution of 1868, which had its inception at Yara, in the Province of Camaguey. It is generally referred to by the Cubans as the “Ten Years War,” although no battles were fought. There were, however, many deaths from disease, especially among the Spanish troops, and the cost of the contest was three hundred million dollars, which amount was charged to the Cuban debt.
In February, 1878, the treaty of Zanjon was{56} entered into by the representatives of Spain and those of the independent government which the insurgents had created on paper and had affected to maintain in the field. Under this convention the Crown agreed to substantial civil and political concessions in favor of the people of Cuba. These undertakings, the Cubans declare, were never fulfilled. Spanish officials, on the other hand, maintain that the mother country actually granted more than her obligation demanded of her. The truth will be found in the fact that while laws were promulgated in accordance with the promises given at Zanjon, they were not carried out. Thus although documentary evidence might be adduced to show that the Cubans enjoyed a liberal government after 1878, their condition, in reality, remained virtually unchanged.
The hopes that had been inspired by the treaty of Zanjon quickly waned and the spirit of discontent revived. This was greatly increased by the economic troubles resulting from the depression of the sugar trade, which began in 1884, and the total abolition of slavery in 1887.
Meanwhile Spain continued to regulate the financial affairs of the Island with the old-time{57} reckless mismanagement. From 1893 to 1898 the revenues of Cuba derived from excessive taxation, heavy duties and the Habana lottery, averaged about $25,000,000 per annum. Of this amount, $10,500,000 was appropriated to the payment of the Cuban debt, which by 1897 had swelled to the enormous aggregate of $400,000,000, or $283.54 per capita, a ratio more than three times as great as the per capita debt of Spain. For the support of the army, navy, administration and church in Cuba, $12,000,000 was allotted. The remaining $2,500,000 was allowed for public works, education and general improvements in Cuba, independent of municipal expenditures. It may be added that when, as in better times, the revenues had been very much larger, the demands of the home Government were proportionally increased.
At the close of the eighties, the price of sugar rose to an abnormal height and Cuba entered upon a brief period of prosperity. Political agitation abated and the Island sank into a more peaceful condition than it had known for many years. It was, however, but the lull before the storm. The repeal of the Blaine reciprocity agreement dealt a deadly blow to the Cuban sugar industry. At once conditions{58} changed. Quiescence gave place to agitation. The revolutionary spirit awoke with greater determination than ever, fanned by the thought that Cuba, independent or annexed to the United States could always rely upon a favorable market for her principal product.
Plot and conspiracy soon became rife and received the support of a number of influential men, who had hitherto held aloof, but who now despaired of permanent prosperity for the Island under Spanish rule. Men who had taken part in the Ten Years War began to organize in secret, and several of their former leaders, Gomez, Garcia, Maceo, and others, returned to Cuba from their voluntary exile.
In 1895 was launched the insurrection which culminated in the freedom of Cuba. The leaders of the movement entered upon it with the deliberate design of involving the United States and their success in doing so brought about a result which they could not have attained otherwise.
A friendly feeling for Cuba not unmixed with interest considerations, had existed in the United States for many years. Annexation had been discussed during the presidency of John Quincy Adams, and President Polk made{59} a proposition to the Spanish Government for the purchase of the Island. In 1854, the search of several American merchant ships by Spanish cruisers led to the issuance of the “Ostend Manifesto,” a protest on the part of the United States. In this document it was declared that “the possession of Cuba by a foreign power was a menace to the peace of the United States, and that Spain be offered the alternative of accepting $200,000,000 for her sovereignty over the Island, or having it taken from her by force.” During the Ten Years War President Grant expressed to the Spanish Government his belief that only independence and emancipation could settle the Cuban question, and that intervention might be necessary to end the war. He repeatedly proffered the good offices of the United States in re?stablishing peace. Meanwhile the capture of the Virginius, in 1873, and the summary execution of fifty-three of her passengers and crew, by order of the Spanish authorities, came very near to involving the countries in war.
From the outbreak of the rebellion of 1895, the people of the United States evinced a strong sympathy for the Cubans. This was reflected by the action of Congress in directing President{60} Cleveland to proffer the good offices of the United States to Spain with a view to ending the war and securing the independence of the Island. In 1896 both Republican and Democratic national conventions passed resolutions of sympathy for the Cubans and demanded that the Government should take action.
At the close of the same year, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported a resolution recognizing the republic of Cuba, but it was never taken from the calendar. Meanwhile reports of outrages and indignities to American citizens in Cuba led to official protest and the appointment of Judge William R. Day to investigate conditions. Popular indignation in the United States was further aroused by the press reports of the dreadful effects of General Weyler’s plan of reconcentration.
In May, 1897, Congress voted $50,000 for the purchase of supplies to relieve the needs of the reconcentrados, on the ground that many of them were reported to be American citizens. Shortly afterwards, the United States requested the Spanish Government to put an end to the reconcentration system and to recall Captain General Weyler. Spain received the requests with professed favor, but, after months{61} had elapsed, without any action being taken, the battleship Maine was sent to Habana for the protection of American citizens.
On the night of February 15th, the Maine was blown up and two hundred and sixty-six of her complement lost their lives. President McKinley appointed a board of naval officers to investigate the circumstances. The resultant report, which was submitted to Congress, declared that the ship had been destroyed by an external explosion.
The condition of affairs aroused serious apprehensions on the part of the Spanish Government and at the same time exhilarated the insurgent leaders. Both parties realized that the intervention of the United States was imminent. The former proposed a suspension of hostilities, pending an agreement upon terms of peace, and offered to appropriate $600,000 for the benefit of the reconcentrados. These overtures were promptly rejected by the insurgent leaders.
Early in April, the President sent a message to Congress requesting authority to end the war and to secure in Cuba the establishment of a stable government, capable of fulfilling its international obligations and maintaining{62} peace. This was, in effect, a request to enter upon war with Spain.
A few days later, Congress passed joint resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Spain from Cuba and empowering the President to use the naval and military forces of the United States to carry the resolutions into effect. This was virtually a declaration of war.