A Fatal Treaty—Gladstone's Opinion—The Concert of Europe—The Unspeakable Turk and His Methods—England's Responsibility—Mr. Gladstone's Energetic Action—Lord Rosebery Resigns—Gladstone's Astounding Letter—"I Shall Keep Myself to Myself"—"Abdul the Damned"—"A Man whose every Impulse is Good"—The Convention of Cyprus—Russia and England


There is an old and cynical saying that no lawyer draws up an agreement or contract without an eye to the future. If ever a document left trouble for the future it was the Berlin Treaty. The clause referring to Armenia was tantamount to handing over the wretched Armenians to the Turks; for the Concert of Europe, that misbegotten child of the Treaty of Paris, has failed consistently in its futile endeavours.

The contention of Russia has never been better expressed than by Gladstone in a letter to me dated January 2, 1877, in which he wrote: "A guarantee dependent on the Turk for its execution becomes thereby no guarantee at all." Again, on February 6, he wrote: "The real issue, so far as I can see, will arise when the question shall assume this form: Is Russia to be left alone to execute the will and work of Europe?" This is exactly what Russia did in 1876, unless it be contended that the "will of Europe" sanctioned the wholesale massacre of {148} harmless citizens by the very power ordained to protect them—the Ruling Power.

The Sublime Porte has been as consistent as the Concert of Europe in evading its responsibilities, and it is needless to say that it as carefully refrained from carrying out its undertaking with regard to Armenia as the Powers on their part did from insisting on the reforms. Possibly the argument of the Concert was that, as there were no "ameliorations and reforms" on the part of the Sublime Porte, there was no opportunity for them to "superintend their application."

None of us who knew the Turk had any doubts as to the truth of the atrocities at Sassoun. These things were too common. The scale differed, the crime was always the same. And what was it?

The crime was the establishment—or the re-establishment—of Turkish Mussulman authority over a Christian race. If that were the crime, who were the criminals? On that point I should like to be allowed to say some plain truths, hoping that my English friends will tolerate the candour in others which they never hesitate to practise themselves. The real criminals who were responsible for the atrocities which horrified the civilised world were not the Kurds—who at first got all the blame. The criminals who perpetrated the massacre were Turkish regular troops, commanded by Turkish officers acting in direct obedience to explicit orders from the Turkish Government.

But although the direct complicity of the "Sublime" Porte in these hideous crimes was not disputed even by the Pashas of Stamboul, it was {149} not with them that the responsibility of these horrors originally lay.

The crime at Sassoun lay primarily at the door of Disraeli. It was one of the many disastrous results of that "peace with honour" which Mr. Gladstone had the courage to describe as a peace that was no peace, with the honour that prevailed among thieves.

That may seem to be a hard saying to those who do not know the facts. To those who do it will be a mere truism.

Why was it that the Armenians at Sassoun were left as sheep before the butcher? Why was it that the Sultan and his Pashas felt themselves perfectly free to issue what order they pleased for the massacre of the poor Armenians? The answer is, unfortunately, only too simple. It was because England at the Berlin Congress, and England alone—for none of the other Powers took any interest in the matter—destroyed the security which Russia had extorted from the Turkish Government at San Stéfano, and substituted for the sterling guarantee of Russia the worthless paper-money of Ottoman promises. Was it not, then, England's doing that these poor wretches were outraged and murdered by the rulers, to whose tender mercies England insisted upon consigning them?

Let me prove my case: In the treaty of San Stéfano, the Turkish Government entered into a direct and explicit obligation to Russia to guarantee the security of the Armenians.

Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stéfano runs thus:

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"As the evacuation by the Russian troops of the territory which they occupy in Armenia, and which is to be restored to Turkey, might give rise to conflicts and complications detrimental to the maintenance of good relations between the two countries, the Sublime Porte engages to carry into effect without further delay the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians."

Now, it is obvious that this clause imposed clear and precise obligations not only upon Turkey, but also upon Russia. If the reforms were not carried out, if the security of the Armenians were not guaranteed, Russia would have been bound to interfere, and would have interfered, to compel the Turks to carry out their treaty obligations.

This article seemed to the British plenipotentiaries to give Russia a virtual protectorate over Armenia, and therefore they insisted upon striking it out. The poor Armenians were forbidden to look for their protection to the strong arm of the Tsar. The Turks were delivered from their express obligation to guarantee the security of their Armenian subjects, and it was calmly decreed that the Armenians should be content with Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty. That clause ran as follows:

"The Sublime Porte engages to realise without delay those ameliorations and reforms which local needs require in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and the Kurds. It undertakes to make known, from time to time, the measures taken {151} with this object to the Powers, who will watch over their application."

Mark the difference. In place of a positive obligation entered into with the only Power near enough and strong enough to enforce the fulfilment of treaty engagements, there was substituted this engagement, over the execution of which the Powers, in their beneficence, promised to watch: as the execution has never begun, the Powers were not overburdened with much "watching." "Waiting" rather expresses what they did—waiting for the Turks to begin the fulfilment of the promises which they made to collective Europe years and years ago. They are waiting still. Meanwhile the Armenians were massacred, as, for example, at Sassoun, and not there only. But even this did not exhaust the criminal responsibility of Lord Beaconsfield. He had taken Cyprus as a material pledge for the execution of reforms in Asiatic Turkey. But there were no reforms in Asiatic Turkey. The only effect of the Anglo-Turkish Convention was to increase the confidence of the Sultan that he could do as he pleased in Armenia, Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty notwithstanding.

England, therefore, was responsible in three ways. She destroyed the Russian guarantee exacted by the Treaty of San Stéfano. She framed the worthless "watching" clause of the Berlin Treaty, and then, to preclude all possibility of effective pressure upon the Turk, she concluded the Cyprus Convention, which established an illegal British protectorate over the Asiatic dominions of the Sultan.

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At Sassoun was seen the result of that policy. No amount of dispatch-writing, friendly advice, or admonition would improve the condition of the Armenians. Remonstrances were idle. What was wanted was action. But who could act? No Power could occupy and administer Armenia but Russia. Unfortunately, she had no wish and no obligation now to undertake so arduous and so thankless a task. But who else was to do it?

No one did it; for Russia had once played St. George and Europe had thrown back the maiden to the dragon.

When I heard of the Armenian massacres in 1894, I was more horrified than surprised. When the full confirmation of the horrible news arrived, it made my heart sick. What was even worse, if that were possible, was the fact that the relations between England and Russia were strained. All Mr. Gladstone's energies were concentrated upon urging on Lord Salisbury's Ministry the coercion of the Sultan, single-handed if need be. The result was Lord Rosebery's resignation as Leader of the Liberal Party in the Lords, as a protest against a policy that in his opinion could not fail to plunge Europe into war.

Prince Lobanoff, who was responsible for Russia's policy of opposition to armed intervention against Turkey, aroused Mr. Gladstone's indignation, and I came in for a share of his wrath by virtue of my defence of Prince Lobanoff. At that time Mr. Gladstone wrote to me:


{153}

HAWARDEN CASTLE,
    October 18th, 1895.

It is most kind of you to waste powder on an outcast like me; an outcast first from active life; secondly I feel—from your scheme of opinion I cannot read your articles—not because I deal so little with newspaper print, but because I am afraid of disagreeing with you, and in this case I prefer ignorance to strife. I am, you see, possessed with an idea as to the truer mode of dealing with the Sultan and his accursed system, founded upon my experience in the year 1880—when we received most valuable and effective aid from your good and great Emperor Alexander II.

Now I have no power and little knowledge—and my imagined knowledge may be all wrong. It is to this effect:


(1) That Lord Salisbury is not up to the mark in all points, but that he is the best of those who have the matter in their hands. The best there is at the moment to do the work.

(2) That he is held back by others—not to act, say, according to rumour, most by Russia.


If this is so it is most painful, for this Armenian case is the very worst of all that has yet happened, and if the Powers are beaten by the Sultan, whom every one of them can crush with the little finger, they will be deservedly covered with indelible disgrace.

There is plain speaking for you.


{154}

It was; but I replied soothingly, trying to put to him Russia's case. His reply electrified Europe. It ran:


October 22nd, 1895.

MY DEAR MADAME NOVIKOFF,

In these sad circumstances I am so far comforted as to believe that there is no occasion for controversy between you and me. We have in some critical circumstances heartily co-operated, and I think we have the same sentiments as to Armenia.

I shall carefully and for many reasons keep myself to myself.

I see in The Times that the wretched Sultan, whom God has given as a curse to mankind, waving his flag of triumph, and the adversaries at his feet are Russia, France and England.

As to the division of the shame amongst them, I care little. Except that I hope that my own country, and for its good, be made conscious and be exhibited to the world for its own full share—whatever that may be.

May God in His mercy send a speedy end to the grinning Turk and all his doings. So I said when I could say, and could even sometimes do, so I say in my political decrepitude and even death.

Always yours sincerely,
    W. E. GLADSTONE.


This letter was the sensation of the hour. Here are some of the English press comments upon it: "An extraordinary letter," "the sensation of the hour," "startling vehemence," "now famous letter," {155} "essentially Gladstonian," "silly and wicked balderdash," "ring of life and strength," "shameful letter," "Tory papers are terribly shocked," "has startled the civilised world."

When I returned from Russia to England in 1896, one of the first things I saw on reaching London was "Plain words to the Assassin," in large letters on the newspaper posters, staring down upon me from the hoardings, and I found people still telling each other what a dreadful fellow the Turk really was!

Plain words, strong words, fierce words was the diet presented to the Sultan in varied diplomatic sauces; but the dish was always the same, and his response was quite as monotonous. To empty words, plain or flavoured, he replied by massacres, and this seemed likely to go on for ever. For us this passe-temps was monotony. To the poor Armenian, alas, it is death!

I rejoiced to see that the English nation was weary of the vaticinations of diplomatists, and was urgently demanding not words, but deeds. It reminded me of 1876, that great year when so many brave attempts were made to change its traditional policy—attempts which, unfortunately, met with but partial success. And above all I rejoiced to hear once more sounding deep and loud, like the great bell of our grand Kremlin, above the general hubbub, the commanding note of Mr. Gladstone's voice—that voice through which the heart and conscience of nations has so often found utterance.

But although in some respects like 18............